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Securities regulation deals primarily with the laws preventing and
providing remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds. Texas has
two major statutes to combat securities fraud: The Texas Securities Act
(TSA) and the Texas Stock Fraud Act (TSFA).1 Since the legislature
modeled the fraud provisions of the TSA on the federal statutes,2 Texas
courts use federal decisions under the federal statutes to interpret the
TSA’s similar language.3 This article, therefore, includes the Fifth Circuit
cases involving state law and securities fraud under federal law. The
* H. Andy Professor of Commercial Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas; B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1969, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E.
1969, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D. 1975, University of
Texas at Austin.
1. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1 (West 2015); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 27.01 (West 2015).
2. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. (Comment to 1977 Amendment);
House Comm. of Fin. Insts., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 469, 65th Leg., R.S. (1977).
3. See, e.g., Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., 402 S.W.3d 719, 741
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v.
Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 102 n.13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see
also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 66 SMU L. REV. 1129, 1130 n.3 (2013)
[hereinafter Flint, Securities Regulation 2013] (discussing Highland Capital Management,
L.P.); George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 60 SMU L. REV. 1293, 1299–1302 (2007)
(discussing Haskell).
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author does not intend for this article to exhaust all aspects of securities
regulation but rather to update the Texas-based securities practitioner on
new Texas developments of interest during the period of December 1,
2015, to November 30, 2016.4
I. COVERAGE OF THE TEXAS SECURITIES ACTS
The definitions, especially those relating to what constitutes a security
or a stock and the persons liable, as well as federal preclusion of state
securities fraud actions, determine the fraudulent transactions subject to
the state’s securities acts.5 One Texas court dealt with an insurance
agency peddler of interests in a diversified pool of life settlements who
made several omissions of material fact, was not registered with the Texas
State Securities Board (TSSB), and claimed the life settlements were not
securities.6 Another Texas court dealt with aiding and abetting liability
for an investment company’s failure to disclose in the sales materials that
the investment company would have a high concentration of low tranche
securities, the degree to which they would be subordinated, and the ex-
tent to which the assets were leveraged.7
A. CLARIFICATION OF ENTREPRENEURIAL OR MANAGEMENT
EFFORTS OF OTHERS FOR LIFE SETTLEMENTS
Peddlers of life settlements in Texas continue their best efforts to trans-
fer what little wealth they have remaining to their lawyers by challenging
the finding of the Texas Supreme Court, and numerous other courts and
state securities boards, that life settlements are investment contracts and
therefore securities under the TSA.8 A life settlement is a transaction
under which an owner of a life insurance policy sells the policy at a dis-
count (reflecting a future rate of return and premium costs over the
owner’s expected life) in order to obtain current monies to spend. A fi-
nancial intermediary locates the policy sellers, negotiates the discount,
locates investors to provide the purchase price of fractional interests in
the life insurance policies, takes title to the policies as agents of the inves-
tors, and maintains a trust fund to pay the premiums. If the insured out-
lives the life expectancy used to discount the sales price of the policy, a
bonding company purchases the policy, providing a lower but guaranteed
return. These financial intermediaries are notorious for underestimating
4. Flint, Securities Regulation 2013, supra note 3, at 1130.
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)–(3) (2012); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-
4(A)–(B).
6. Matlock v. Hill, No. 07–15–00048–CV, 2016 WL 3659988, at *3–5 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo June 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
7. Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Purdue Ave. Inv’rs LP, No. 05–15–00369–CV, 2016 WL
2941266, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 18, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
8. See Life Partners, Inc. v. Arnold, 464 S.W.3d 660, 662 (Tex.), reh’g denied, 2015
Tex. LEXIS 849 (Sept. 11, 2015); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 2
SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 437, 439–45 & n.57 (2016) [hereinafter Flint, Securities Regulation
2016] (discussing Life Partners and similar conclusions on the other states).
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the life expectancies used in calculating the discounts,9 which information
they conceal from the investors prior to their purchases. These miscalcu-
lations have the effect of reducing the expected rates of return and in-
creasing the premium costs, potentially leading to losses on the
investment. These peddlers conceal those errors by providing the inves-
tors with only the total acquisition cost, with no breakdown of the
amounts paid to the policy owners, the escrow amount, the peddlers’ fees,
and the expenses such as physician fees, escrow fees, consultant fees, and
broker fees.
In Matlock v. Hill, the Amarillo Court of Appeals dealt with an insur-
ance agency that had sold interests in life settlements on behalf of A & O
Life Fund, L.P. to a couple for $100,000.10 The fund went bankrupt, caus-
ing a loss of 90% of the couple’s funds.11 The couple sued the broker for
fraud under the TSA as an aider and abettor.12 The trial court’s findings
included that persons selling securities in Texas need to be registered, the
life settlements marketed in a diversified pool constituted securities, A &
O Life Fund had told the insurance agency the life settlements were se-
curities in January 2007 when they removed him from selling the life set-
tlements, and the insurance agency failed to disclose that it was not
registered and was prohibited from selling the life settlements, failed to
disclose that the bond company backing the life settlements was not regis-
tered in Texas, and failed to disclose that the bond company was barred
subject to a cease and desist order until such registration occurred.13 The
trial court awarded damages for the $100,000 less that recovered from
other sources plus attorney’s fees.14 The court of appeals affirmed.15
The main issue was whether the life settlements were securities.16 The
insurance agency presented several weak arguments. First, it relied on a
2004 opinion of the Waco Court of Appeals, which has since been de-
9. See Nathan Vardi, Early Death, FORBES.COM (Sept. 17, 2009, 1:22 PM), http://www
.forbes.com/2009/09/17/life-insurance-settlements-a-and-o-business-insurance.html (dis-
cussing the practices of A & O Life Fund and its bankruptcy causing tens of millions of
dollars in losses); see also Mark Maremont & Leslie Scism, Odds Skew Against Investors In
Bets on Strangers’ Lives, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2010), at A1 (For investments made in 2002
through 2005, 83% of the insureds lived past their life expectancies as calculated by Life
Partners, Inc.). A & O Life Fund was the financial intermediary for the transactions in-
volved in Matlock, 2016 WL 3659988, at *1.
10. Matlock, 2016 WL 3659988, at *1. As to the type of business entity for A & O Life
Funds, see SEC v. W Financial Group, LLC, No. 3–08–CV–0499–N, 2009 WL 636540, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2009). See also Brown v. Entrust Admin. Servs., No. H–10–5220, 2011
WL 1230275, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2011).
11. Matlock, 2016 WL 3659988, at *1.
12. Id. at *1, *5.
13. Id. at *5 n.5.
14. Id. at *1.
15. Id.
16. Id. The insurance agency also complained of the retroactive application of the de-
termination that life settlements were securities, but the Texas Supreme Court had dis-
pensed with that argument since courts had treated life settlements as securities for
decades. Id. at *4; see Life Partners, Inc. v. Arnold, 464 S.W.3d 660, 685 (Tex. 2015).
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bunked by the Texas Supreme Court.17 Second, it claimed the exemption
from the definition of security for insurance companies under TSA sec-
tion 4A applied; however, it supplied no evidence that A & O Life Fund,
L.P. was subject to the supervision of the Texas Department of Insurance
or had filed a form of the policy as required by the exemption.18 Third, it
claimed that, of the four factors required by the supreme court to estab-
lish an investment contract as a security, one was missing, namely the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.19 The court of appeals
noted that although the supreme court had not explained what it meant
by entrepreneurial or managerial efforts, it did provide examples for life
settlements, namely:
1) the identification of the insureds, 2) the negotiation of the dis-
counts for the policy, 3) the evaluation of the policy terms and condi-
tions, 4) the evaluation of the insured’s health, 5) the acquisition of
the policies, 6) the acquisition of others to buy interests in the life
settlement, 7) the evaluation of the insured’s life expectancy, and 8)
the selection of a purchase price to yield sufficient profit.20
The court of appeals then noted that the trial court had evidence, includ-
ing that of an expert witness, of A & O Life Fund’s selection of the right
policies, evaluation of the insureds’ life expectancies, controlling risk
through pooling for diversification, payment of future premiums, moni-
toring of the insured’s health, and reinvestment of revenues from death
benefits.21 Consequently, the court of appeals found this element of an
investment contract satisfied.22
The court of appeals faced two lesser issues. The first concerned the
non-existent findings with respect to aiding and abetting.23 The court of
appeals did not find these dispositive since it was clear from the evidence
and findings that the insurance agency was not registered as required
under TSA section 12 and that the insurance agency had made numerous
omissions of material facts when selling the life settlement.24 Both of
these provided for liability in the amount of the awarded damages under
TSA sections 33A(1) for failure to register and 33A(2) for selling through
17. Matlock, 2016 WL 3659988, at *2; compare Arnold, 464 S.W.3d at 666–84, 678–80
(life settlements are securities, discussing the error of Griffitts), with Griffitts v. Life Part-
ners, Inc., No. 10-01-00271-CV, 2004 WL 1178418, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco May 26, 2004,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (life settlements not securities since the only significant post-sale factor
is death of insured, not efforts of others).
18. Matlock, 2016 WL 3659988, at *2; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A)
(“this definition [of security] shall not apply to any insurance policy, endowment policy,
annuity contract, optional annuity contract, or any contract or agreement in relation to and
in consequence of any such policy or contract, issued by an insurance company subject to
the supervision or control of the Texas Department of Insurance when the form of such
policy or contract has been duly filed with the Department”).
19. Matlock, 2016 WL 3659988, at *3–4.
20. Id. at *3 (citing Arnold, 464 S.W.3d at 683); see Arnold, 464 S.W.3d at 682–84
(describing the post-purchase efforts).
21. Matlock, 2016 WL 3659988, at *3.
22. Id. at *4.
23. Id. at *5.
24. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-12.
2017] Securities Regulation 423
an omission of a material fact.25 The second involved the award of attor-
ney’s fees.26 The court of appeals noted that the TSA allows recovery of
attorney fees if they are equitable under the circumstances.27 The court of
appeals upheld the trial court’s equitable findings that the insurance
agency sold the involved life settlements after being told it could no
longer sell them for A & O Life Fund since it was not registered, and that
in 2001 the TSSB had issued a cease and desist order against the insur-
ance agency for selling different securities while not being registered.28
B. AIDER AND ABETTOR LIABILITY FOR UNDERWRITERS
AND INVESTMENT ADVISORS
The ease of becoming judgment proof in Texas with liberal exemptions
from execution of judgment makes secondary liability very important.
The Texas statutes provide for several vicarious liability theories, includ-
ing aiding and abetting liability and control person liability. Since federal
securities law does not allow a private investor to recover against aiders
and abettors,29 aiding and abetting has become a significant aspect of
state securities law. One Texas appellate court opinion dealt with aider
and abettor liability of an underwriter of, and an investment advisor to,
an investment company, whose directors were employees of the under-
writer and investment advisor, for failing to disclose in the sales materials,
while being aware, that the investment company’s manager, an employee
of the investment advisor, intended to invest in deeply subordinated
tranches of structured, asset-based securities such as mortgage-backed se-
curities, collateralized mortgage obligations, and collateralized debt obli-
gations exposing the investors to a high degree of risk through a lack of
diversification and implicit leverage.30
The Dallas Court of Appeals confronted several disingenuous argu-
ments in Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Purdue Avenue Investors LP.31
The case involved a notorious fraud committed by a once prominent in-
vestment company manager under which investors lost over a billion dol-
lars.32 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged the
25. Matlock, 2016 WL 3659988, at *5; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-
33A(1)–(2).
26. Matlock, 2016 WL 3659988, at *6.
27. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33D(7).
28. Matlock, 2016 WL 3659988, at *6–7.
29. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 175–78 (1994).
30. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Purdue Ave. Inv’rs LP, No. 05–15–00369–CV, 2016
WL 2941266 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 18, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
31. Id.
32. See SEC Charges Morgan Keegan and Two Employees With Fraud Related to Sub-
prime Mortgages, SEC (Apr. 7, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/new/press/2010/2010-53.htm
[https://perma.cc/NQ7Q-BPDU]; see also Joe Bel Bruno, Morgan Keegan and Its Onetime
Star Kelsoe Charged by SEC, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2010), www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424052702303720604575169950288562186 (Funds managed by James Kelsoe led “the
mutual fund pack” until the housing downturn caused the funds’ value to drop by 60%, the
worst of any U.S. fund that year.).
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investment company manager with inflating the value of thinly-traded
subprime securities by urging outside brokers not to offer price informa-
tion unless the number exceeded a certain value and convincing the ac-
counting staff to accept upward “price adjustments,” both practices done
to hide the declining value of the investment companies’ investments.33
The SEC also charged the underwriter marketing the investment compa-
nies’ shares with failing to employ reasonable procedures to insure accu-
rate net asset values and for selling shares on the basis of the inflated
prices.34 The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) charged
the underwriter with marketing and selling investment company shares to
investors using inaccurate and misleading sales materials.35 The invest-
ment companies were heavily invested in risky subordinated tranches of
mortgage- and asset-backed securities, but the underwriter’s misleading
sales materials and deficient guidance for training its brokers on the risks
caused the underwriter to make material misrepresentations to prospec-
tive investors, namely portraying the investment companies as safer than
they actually were even though the underwriter was aware of the special
risks and their unsuitability for certain investors.36 The underwriter fur-
ther failed to disclose to investors in 2007 that the investment companies
were then seriously and adversely affected by the subprime mortgage cri-
sis.37 The SEC, state regulators, and FINRA obtained a settlement for
the fraud from the underwriter and its affiliated investment advisor em-
ploying the investment company’s investment manager, without an ad-
mission or denial of the SEC’s findings, in the amount of $200 million to
compensate the investors, and barred the investment manager from the
securities industry.38
Morgan Keegan involved closed-end management investment compa-
nies established and operated by subsidiaries of Regions Financial Corpo-
ration, namely the underwriter and the investment advisor described
above.39 One involved fund sought a high current income level by “in-
33. Bruno, supra note 32.
34. Bruno, supra note 32; SEC Charges Morgan Keegan, supra note 32.
35. FINRA Files Complaint Against Morgan Keegan & Company for Misleading Cus-





38. See Morgan Asset Mgmt., Exchange Act Release No. 34-64720, 2011 WL 2482883,
at *1 (June 22, 2011) (without admitting); id. at *15 (barring the investment manager); id.
at *16 (civil penalty of $75 million); Morgan Keegan to Pay $200 Million to Settle Fraud
Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage-Backed Securities, SEC (June 22, 2011), https://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-132.htm [https://perma.cc/928D-8XV8]; see also Mor-
gan Keegan to Pay $678,390 to Texas for Deceiving Investors in Bond Funds, TEX. STATE
SEC. BD. (Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/morgan-keegan-pay-
678390-texas-deceiving-investors-bond-funds [https://perma.cc/CT73-U69D] (Texas was
awarded $678,390, part of an additional $10 million fine that Keegan agreed to pay the
state).
39. The funds were the RMK Strategic Income Fund and the RMK Advantage In-
come Fund. Several of the directors and officers of the funds are also officers of Regions
Financial Corporation or its subsidiaries, Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. and Morgan Asset
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vest[ing] a majority of its total assets in below investment grade debt se-
curities . . . including corporate bonds, mortgage-backed and asset-backed
securities and municipal and foreign government obligations,” but also by
investing in “investment grade securities, up to 15% of [the fund’s] total
assets in foreign debt and . . . equity,” and as much as 25% in domestic
equity.40 And the fund could leverage approximately 33% of the fund’s
total assets, including the borrowed amount.41 The other would invest
similarly, but most of the fund’s assets would be invested some of the
time in investment grade securities and at other times in below grade
securities, and it included securities of companies in the process of bank-
ruptcy proceedings.42 The investor had purchased $2 million in 2005
through his own broker and lost, bringing suit in 2009.43 The crux of the
matter, similar to the FINRA action, was the adequacy of the disclosure
in the prospectus.44 The prospectus described the proposed investments
as diversified with 25% to 65% of assets invested in below investment
grade debt securities and that leverage from borrowings up to 33 1/3% of
assets could occur.45 Not disclosed, however, was that two-thirds of the
portfolio was invested in “subordinated tranches and securities . . . mostly
Management, Inc., the defendants in the case. See RMK Strategic Income Fund, Inc., An-
nual Shareholder Report for Mar. 31, 2004 (Form N-CSR), at 20–24 (June 6, 2004), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1275902/000089843204000518/form-ncsr.txt https://per
ma.cc/5D27-UBXV] [hereinafter RMK Form for Mar. 31, 2004] (listing J. Kenneth Alder-
man, fund director [Vice President of Regions Financial Corporation since 2000, C.E.O. of
Morgan Asset since 2002], Allen B. Morgan, Jr., fund director [a director of Regions since
2001, Chairman of Morgan Keegan since 1969], Carter E. Anthony, fund President [Presi-
dent of Morgan Asset since 2002], Thomas R. Gamble, fund Vice-President [executive of
Regions Financial since 1981], Joseph C. Weller, fund Treasurer [Executive Vice President
of Morgan Keegan since 1969], Charles D. Maxwell, fund Secretary [Asst. Treasurer and
Asst. Secretary of Morgan Keegan since 1994], J. Thompson Weller, Asst. Secretary [Con-
troller of Morgan Keegan since 2001]). “Morgan Asset Management, Inc., is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Regions Financial Corporation.” Id. at 13. Morgan Keegan is also a
wholly owned subsidiary of Regions Financial Corporation. RMK Strategic Income Fund,
Inc., Annual Shareholder Report for Mar. 31, 2007 (Form N-CSR), at 86 (June 6, 2007),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1275902/000119312507130986/dncsr.htm [https://
perma.cc/B5M6-K3P5] [hereinafter RMK Form for Mar. 31, 2007].
40. RMK Form for Mar. 31, 2007, supra note 39, at 2 (objective and strategy of the
RMK Advantage Income Fund, Inc.).
41. RMK Form for Mar. 31, 2007, supra note 39, at 2.
42. RMK Form for Mar. 31, 2007, supra note 39, at 56 (objective and strategy of the
RMK Strategic Income Fund, Inc.).
43. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Purdue Ave. Inv’rs LP, No. 05–15–00369–CV, 2016
WL 2941266, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 18, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see Brief for
Appellees at 1–2, Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266 (No. DC-09-14448), 2015 WL
5312065 (for 2005 purchase).
44. Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266, at *3.
45. See, e.g., RMK Strategic Income Fund, Inc., Registration Statement (Form N-2), at
1 (Mar. 17, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1275902/000089843204000261/
rmkstrategic-n2a.txt [https://perma.cc/38N5-H4RB] (“RMK Strategic Income Fund,
Inc. . . . is a newly-organized, diversified, closed-end management investment company.”);
id. at 2 (“[T]he Fund . . . will invest up to 65%, but not less than 25%, of its total assets in
below investment grade debt securities.”); id. at 3 (“The Fund currently intends to use
leverage through borrowings in an amount equal to approximately 33 1/3% of its total
assets. . . .”).
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backed by housing and housing finance.”46 Also not disclosed was the
heightened risk of investing in the bottom tranches and the effective
leveraging from the subordination.47 Expert testimony indicated that this
investment was not a diversified investment and was risky, subject to be-
ing wiped out even if a small amount of the underlying loans went into
default.48 These risks were not disclosed until late 2007.49 After a trial
before the judge, the trial court entered a judgment against the brokerage
firm underwriter and the investment advisor for $2.1 million, including
prejudgment interest.50 The court of appeals modified the judgment and
affirmed.51
The main issue involved an alleged discrepancy in the trial court’s judg-
ment and its conclusions of law, which convinced the underwriter and
investment manager to doubt whether they were properly found liable.52
The trial court’s conclusions of law indicated the underwriter and invest-
ment advisor were liable as aiders and abettors.53 But the final judgment
recited recovery under TSA section 33C(2), the provision for issuer liabil-
ity for a material misstatement or omission in a prospectus for a regis-
46. Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266, at *7.
47. Id.
48. Id. The expert witness was the former Associate Chief Economist with the SEC
and had testified in more than 50 trials and arbitrations that involved the RMK bond
funds. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 43, at 3.
49. Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266, at *8; compare RMK Strategic Income Fund,
Inc., Semi-Annual Shareholder Report for Sept. 30, 2007 (Form N-CSR), at 2 (Dec. 5,
2007), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1275902/000119312507259684/dncsrs.htm
[https://perma.cc/W33H-39XD] (The “Investment Risks” section of this report notes that
mortgage-backed or asset-backed securities are subordinated and that this increases risks
since the fund may not receive payments until the pool’s other obligations have been met,
and because below investment grade bonds are less liquid, particularly during times of
economic uncertainty.), with RMK Form for Mar. 31, 2007, supra note 39, at 2 (This “In-
vestment Risks” section mentions leverage as an opportunity).
50. See Final Judgment at ¶ 1, Purdue Ave. Inv’rs LP v. Morgan Keegan & Co., No.
DC0914448, 2014 WL 10298830, at *1 (101st Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex. Dec. 2, 2014).
51. Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266, at *1.
52. Id. at *5.
53. See id. The conclusions of law recited a finding of the four elements for aider and
abettor liability under the TSA from Darocy v. Albildtrup, 345 S.W.3d 129, 138–39 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.), namely (1) a primary violation of TSA; (2) the aider’s “gen-
eral awareness” of the role it played in the violation; (3) the aider’s “substantial assistance”
in the carrying out violation; and (4) the aider’s acting with reckless disregard for the truth.
Id.; see also Frank v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Flint, Securities Regulation 2013, supra note 3, at 1136–37 (dis-
cussing Darocy).
The conclusions of law also recited control person liability under TSA Section 33F(1),
but lacked the findings of the two elements for control liability under the TSA from Barnes
v. SWS Fin. Servs., Inc., 97 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). See George
Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 57 SMU L. REV. 1207, 1212–13 (2004) (discussing
Barnes); Frank, 11 S.W.3d at 384 (discussing (1) the controller’s exercise of control over
the operations in general; and (2) the controller’s power over the specific activity of the
primary violation). See also Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266, at *5 (Finding of Law 34).
A perusal of the shareholder reports of the investment companies indicate the officers and
several directors of the investment companies were officers of the underwriter and invest-
ment advisor. See supra note 39, suggesting that control person liability also should have
been found.
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tered offering.54 Consequently, the underwriter and investment manager
sought reversal since this cause of action against the issuers had not been
pled or proved.55 Note, however, that the statutory provision for aider
and abettor liability under TSA section 33F specifically says the aider and
abettor is liable under TSA section 33C.56 But rather than point out the
underwriter’s and investment advisor’s inability to read a Texas statute,
the court of appeals proceeded to examine the petition and discovered
three counts, one for issuer liability, one for aider and abettor liability,
and one for control person liability, together providing sufficient notice to
allege causes of action for primary and secondary liability under the
TSA.57 As to the proof of the primary violation, the material misstate-
ments and omissions in the prospectus, the court of appeals examined the
evidence provided by the two expert witnesses, one explaining the invest-
ment companies’ losses stemmed from the failure to diversify and the
other claiming the losses came from a systemic meltdown caused by the
sub-prime mortgage crisis, and concluded that a reasonable fact-finder
would reach the same verdict as did the trial court.58 For proof of the
secondary liability, the court of appeals examined the testimony of the
investment advisor’s employee chosen to design and manage the invest-
ment companies and the expert testimony and again concluded a reason-
able fact-finder would reach the same verdict concerning aider and
abettor liability.59 The court of appeals then addressed the alleged dis-
crepancy between the trial court’s judgment and its conclusions of law,
found that the evidence, arguments, and pleadings were directed to both
the primary violation by the issuing investment companies and secondary
liability of the underwriter and investment advisor so the court of appeals
could, and did, modify the final judgment to clarify that their liability
came under both TSA sections 33C and 33F.60
The other alleged issues of the underwriter and investment manager
were no better thought out. First, they claimed the three-in-five-year stat-
ute of limitations should have begun to run at the first shareholder re-
port.61 That first report in 2005 indicated a large portion of assets in non-
54. See Final Judgment, supra note 50 (“judgment for Plaintiffs . . . pursuant to TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(c)(2).”); see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-
33C(2) (“If the prospectus required in connection with the registration contains, as of its
effective date, an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, the issuer is liable to a person buying the registered
security. . . .”).
55. Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266, at *5.
56. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (“A person who directly or indi-
rectly with intent to deceive or defraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law
materially aids a[n] . . . issuer of a security is liable under Section . . . 33C jointly and
severally with the . . . issuer, and to the same extent as if he were the . . . issuer.”).
57. Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266, at *5–6.
58. Id. at *7.
59. Id. at *8.
60. Id. at *8–9.
61. Id. at *2; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33H(2) (“No person may sue
under Section . . . 33F so far as it relates to . . . 33C: (a) more than three years after
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investment grade securities, but claimed a high degree of diversification
with no indication of a high concentration of low tranche securities or a
high degree of leverage.62 Consequently, the court of appeals determined
the statute of limitations did not begin to run until later, within the al-
lowed limits.63 Second, the fraudsters complained about a biased trial
judge due to his familiarity with financial matters; however, the court of
appeals found the record showed the trial judge remained impartial and
reflected his impatience with both parties when they tried to explain fi-
nancial concepts to him that he already knew.64 Third, they complained
of the admission as evidence of an SEC cease and desist order and a joint
notice of intent to revoke registration by several state securities commis-
sioners since these documents were settlement agreements.65 The court
of appeals, rather than enter the debate on whether SEC orders are ad-
missible, found the trial court’s judgment was not based on such evi-
dence.66 This should have been obvious to the underwriter and
investment advisor since the SEC order related to the mis-valuations of
the assets of the investment companies, rather than the misstatements
and omissions in the prospectus.67 Lastly, the fraudsters complained of
the failure to offset against the damages recovered in the SEC and state
securities commissioners’ settlement actions.68 The court of appeals
quickly dismissed this complaint since they had neither pled nor offered
evidence concerning investments in the investment companies made sub-
sequent to the filing of the lawsuit and the administrative bodies’ consent
discovery of the untruth or omission, or after discovery should have been made by the
exercise of reasonable diligence; or (b) more than five years after the sale. . . .”).
62. See, e.g., RMK Strategic Income Fund, Inc., Annual Shareholder Report for Mar.
31, 2005 (Form N-CSR), at 37 (June 6, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1275902/00089843205000476/form-ncsr.txt [https://perma.cc/A2MC-Q7X2] (“Our high in-
come strategy emphasizes very broad diversification utilizing asset categories beyond the
well recognized below investment grade corporate and convertible bonds.”); id. at 39
(portfolio credit rating BB; leveraged assets 26%); id. at 45–46 (asset backed securities—
investment grade 26.2%; asset backed securities—non-investment grade 61.1%).
63. Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266, at *2–4.
64. Id. at *9–11.
65. Id. at *11; compare TEX. R. EVID. 408(a)(2) (West 2016) (“Evidence of the follow-
ing is not admissible either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim:
. . . statements made during compromise negotiations about the claim.”), with TEX. R.
EVID. 803(8) (“The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay: . . . (8) A record
or statement of a public office.”).
66. Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266, at *12; compare Option Res. Grp. v. Chambers
Dev. Co., 967 F. Supp. 846, 851 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (SEC consent decree admissible), with
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 1:00–CV–2838–WBH, 2008 WL
9358563, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 2008) (SEC consent decree inadmissible).
67. See Morgan Asset Mgmt., supra note 38, at 4 (failure to follow valuation policies
and procedures from Nov. 2004 through July 2008).
68. Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266, at *12–13. The investors had entered into an
agreement to defer discovery on attorney’s fees until after full discovery. The trial court,
however, had determined that attorney’s fees would not be equitable, and so denied the
discovery on attorney’s fees. See id. at *14. This decision was affirmed by the court of
appeals since attorney’s fees are at the discretion of the trial court. See TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 581-33D(7) (West 2015) (“[A] buyer . . . may also recover reasonable
attorney’s fees if the court finds that the recovery would be equitable in the
circumstances.”).
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decrees barred offsets against funds recovered under the consent
decrees.69
The comedy of legal arguments continues to enrich the lawyers repre-
senting the underwriter and investment advisor. Their petition for review
before the Texas Supreme Court asserts first that the court of appeals
dramatically expanded secondary liability under the TSA by not tying it
to the underlying primary violation and claiming the decision stands for
the proposition that just status as an underwriter or investment advisor is
sufficient.70 This of course ignores the examination of the facts and con-
clusions of law made by the court of appeals in affirming both the pri-
mary liability of the investment company for material misstatements and
omissions in the prospectus, and the secondary liability of the underwriter
and investment manager as aiders and abettors.71 That petition asserts
second that the modification to the trial court’s judgment made by the
court of appeals added a cause of action denied by the trial court.72 This
of course is taking advantage of their own misreading of the TSA, which
provides that aiders and abettors are liable under TSA section 33C. All
the court of appeals did by adding liability also under TSA section 33F
was to clarify that the underwriter’s and investment advisor’s liability was
not primary liability as an issuer but secondary liability as an aider and
abettor.
II. REGISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The TSA created the TSSB to handle the registrations required by the
TSA and to serve as an enforcement agency.73 The basic rule of most
securities laws is that securities must be registered with their correspond-
ing regulatory agency unless they fall within an exemption.74 Similarly,
unless they fit an exemption from registration, sellers of securities must
register before selling securities in the state, and investment advisers must
register before rendering investment advice in the state.75 Enforcement
actions generally focus on issuers failing to register their securities, and
simultaneously their selling agents, and making misleading statements to
aid their sales.
The TSSB obtained an informal letter ruling from the Texas Attorney
General that a communication between a staff attorney for the TSSB and
the Director of Enforcement for the TSSB, “made for the purpose of
facilitating . . . professional legal services to the board[,] . . . was intended
69. Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266, at *13; see, e.g., Morgan Asset Mgmt., supra
note 38, at *19 (barring offsets in investor actions).
70. See Petition for Review at *14, Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266 (No. 16-0514),
2016 WL 4628121.
71. See Morgan Keegan, 2016 WL 2941266, at *7–9.
72. See id. at *17–18. The trial court’s final judgment contains the boiler-plate provi-
sion denying “any and all other remaining claims, if any. . . .”); see also Final Judgment,
supra note 50, at ¶ 4.
73. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-2.
74. See id. art. 581-7(A).
75. See id. art. 581-12(A)–(B).
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to be confidential and has remained confidential,” and fits the attorney-
client privilege exception to public disclosure under the Texas Govern-
ment Code.76
A. ISSUER SECURITIES
The TSSB amended its rule permitting Regulation A offerings under
the federal securities laws to register by a notice, payment of a fee, and
where applicable, a consent to service to include Tier 2 offerings under
the new Regulation A definition, since the federal statutes have pre-
empted state registration for such offerings.77 The TSSB also amended its
oil and gas auction exemption to include associate auctioneer, an individ-
ual “employed by and under the direct supervision of a licensed auction-
eer,” that the legislature added to the Texas Occupations Code in 2015.78
And the TSSB amended its conditional exemption for money market
funds to conform to the recent federal definition of a money market fund
eliminating valuations by credit rating.79
B. MARKET OPERATORS
One common feature of state regulation of securities is the usual re-
quirement to register as a seller of securities before selling securities in
the state, and to register as an investment adviser before rendering in-
vestment advice.80 Registration infractions generally surface when apply-
ing or reapplying for registration.
The TSSB simplified the registration process for dealers and invest-
ment advisers by authorizing communications by email and providing a
76. Tex. Att’y. Gen. OR2015-27321, 2015 WL 9693239, at *2; see TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 552.107(1) (West 2015) (not available for public disclosure if “information that the . . .
attorney of a political subdivision is prohibited from disclosing because of a duty to the
client under” evidentiary rules or professional conduct rules). The communication satisfied
the four elements of (1) a communication; (2) rendered to facilitate a legal service; (3)
occurred between only the attorney and the client; and (4) was intended to be confidential.
Tex. Att’y. Gen. OR2015-27321, 2015 WL 9693239, at *2.
77. See 40 Tex. Reg. 6805 (2015), adopted by 41 Tex. Reg. 1223 (2016) (without com-
ment) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 113.1 (West 2016) (amending the rule for qualifi-
cation of securities for Regulation A and B to include federal covered securities)); see also
Flint, Securities Regulation 2016, supra note 8, at 456–57 (discussing the new federal ex-
emption for small issues and the preemption of state registration for Tier 2 issues). Under
the Texas rules, “federal covered securities” are “covered securities” under SA § 18(b). 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 107.2(15) (defining “federal covered securities”). See also 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r(b)(4)(C) (2012) (SA § 18(b) including sales to only accredited persons in definition
of “covered securities” for which state law is preempted); 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2017) (de-
fining Tier 2 issues to be Regulation A offerings between $50 million and $20 million).
78. See 40 Tex. Reg. 6814 (2015), adopted by 41 Tex. Reg. 1225 (2016) (without com-
ment) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.12); see also TEX. OCC. CODE ANN.
§ 1802.001(2) (West 2015) (as amended by Tex. H.B. 2481, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015)) (effec-
tive Sept. 1, 2015).
79. See 41 Tex. Reg. 1195 (2016), adopted by 41 Tex. Reg. 4251 (2016) (without com-
ment) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 123.3); see also 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2017) (the
definition); Money Mkt. Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Investment Company
Act Release No. 33-9616, 79 Fed. Reg. 47735, 47736 (Aug. 14, 2014) (final rule) (explaining
the removal of credit ratings to evaluate money market funds).
80. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-12(A)–(B).
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standardized form by adopting a form for the certification of the balance
sheet by the principal financial officer to be filed with the company’s ap-
plication for registration.81 The TSSB also made some changes to its ex-
pedited registration procedures for military service members and
veterans by revising the form for the request for special consideration of
a registration and authorizing waivers and refunds of the initial registra-
tion fees.82
The TSSB has followed the legislative drive to incentivize new small
business enterprises to raise capital by “tak[ing] advantage of the popu-
lace’s penchant for gambling” through crowdfunding portals run by cer-
tain nonprofits and public entities.83 So the TSSB adopted a new rule for
crowdfunding portal registration for authorized small business develop-
ment entities specified in the statute and for nonprofit community devel-
opment financial institutions certified by the Community Development
Financial Institutions Fund, a program of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, of which thirty-three are in Texas.84 The TSSB also amended its
crowdfunding portal registration “to permit a registered portal to handle
81. See 40 Tex. Reg. 3291 (2015), adopted by 40 Tex. Reg. 6888 (2015) (with one com-
ment) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 104.4(c) (authorizing email communications for
registration)); 40 Tex. Reg. 3294 (2015), adopted by 40 Tex. Reg. 6889 (2015) (with one
comment) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 133.18 (providing the standardized form));
see also 40 Tex. Reg. 3292 (2015), adopted by 40 Tex. Reg. 6888 (2016) (without comment)
(codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.2 (making reference to the new form for the appli-
cation by dealers)); 40 Tex. Reg. 3293 (2015), adopted by 40 Tex. Reg. 6889 (2015) (without
comment) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 116.2 (making reference to the new form for
the application by investment advisers and investment adviser representatives)).
82. See 40 Tex. Reg. 6813 (2015), adopted by 41 Tex. Reg. 1225 (2016) (without com-
ment) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 133.4 (providing the revised form for the re-
quest)); 40 Tex. Reg. 6814 (2015), adopted by 41 Tex. Reg. 1225 (2016) (without comment)
(codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 133.19 (authorizing waivers or refunds to military ap-
plicants)); see also 40 Tex. Reg. 6813 (2015), adopted by 41 Tex. Reg. 1225 (without com-
ment) (repealing the old application request form); 40 Tex. Reg. 6806 (2015), adopted by 41
Tex. Reg. 1223 (2016) (without comment) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.4
(amending the rule for renewal of dealer registration for military applicants)); 40 Tex. Reg.
6809 (2015), adopted by 41 Tex. Reg. 1224 (2016) (without comment) (codified at 7 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 116.18 (amending the rule for renewal of investment adviser and invest-
ment adviser representative registration for military applicants)); Flint, Securities Regula-
tion 2016, supra note 8, at 461 (discussing the expedited rules for military applicants under
the 2013 legislation).
83. See Flint, Securities Regulation 2016, supra note 8, at 456–60 (discussing the efforts
of the TSSB to permit crowdfunding as a method of raising capital, including the initial 8
portals); see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-44(c)(1)–(6) (the public entities are
municipal corporations, those created by municipalities under the government code, the
Texas Veterans Commission, nonprofit community development financial institutions, and
nonprofit organizations with federal government authorization to distribute block grants
for housing and community development).
84. See 41 Tex. Reg. 1192 (2016), adopted by 41 Tex. Reg. 4251 (2016) (one comment)
(codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.20); see also 41 Tex. Reg. 1195 (2016), adopted by
41 Tex. Reg. 4252 (2016) (without comment) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 133.20
(providing the form for the registration)); 41 Tex. Reg. 1196 (2016), adopted by 41 Tex.
Reg. 4252 (2016) (without comment) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.25 (permit-
ting certain small development entities registered in Texas as crowdfunding portals to have
an interest in the issuer listed on their website)).
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investor funds if [they] are held in a segregated account.”85
C. ENFORCEMENT
The TSSB generally enforces its requirements for registration through
emergency orders.86 Because con-artists exploit current news and tech-
nology to confound unwary investors, the TSSB enumerates among the
top ten threats to investors: unregistered individuals because investors
don’t know about the information available from the registration require-
ment; stream-of-income investments because the income is redirectable;
cybersecurity and digital currency risks because the currency is not sub-
ject to regulation; private placements because the investments are not
transparent; use of social media, on which it is easier to lie than in print;
high-yield notes since investors can’t evaluate credit worthiness; life set-
tlements because it is impossible to reliably forecast an individual’s life
expectancy; real estate because the hard asset masks other risks; affinity
fraud because the scheme disperses rapidly among group members; and
oil and gas deals since investors can’t investigate the claim.87 The TSSB’s
actions focus on these threats.
1. Unregistered Securities
The TSSB also took several enforcement actions against issuers for fail-
ure to register their non-exempt securities and selling agents. Since sales
to only accredited persons are covered securities and not subject to state
registration due to preemption,88 all of these actions also involve failures
to verify the accreditation of the investors. These serial fraudsters gener-
ally advertised on the internet and failed to disclose the risks of their
investment schemes, the details of their investments, and their prior se-
curities law disciplinary histories.
Several unregistered securities schemes involved practices included in
the top ten threats to investors. With respect to unregistered interests in
Texas oil and gas prospects marketed through social media touting 117%
initial annual returns and using bitcoin payments without disclosing the
risks, the TSSB modified its 2014 Emergency Cease and Desist order.89
85. See 41 Tex. Reg. 4751 (2016), adopted by 41 Tex. Reg. 9196 (2016) (without com-
ment) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.19 (permitting crowdfunding portals to hold
investor segregated investor funds)); see also 41 Tex. Reg. 4752 (2016), adopted by 41 Tex.
Reg. 8195 (2016) (without comment) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.25 (corre-
sponding change for the intrastate crowdfunding exemption)).
86. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-23-2.
87. See Texas Securities Regulator Identifies Top 10 Investor Threats, TEX. STATE SEC.
BD. (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/investor-alert-texas-se-
curities-regulator-identifies-top-10-investor-threats [https://perma.cc/NMT9-4TC2] (also
listing real estate deals).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(C) (2012) (the JOBS Act provision including sales to only
accredited persons in definition of “covered securities” for which state law is preempted).
89. See In re Balanced Energy, LLC, No. ENF-16-CDO-1745, 2016 WL 4719125, at *9
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 14, 2016) (ordered to stop selling unregistered securities); see also In
re Balanced Energy, LLC, No. 312-14-3801, 2016 WL 2941389 (Tex. Office of Admin.
Hearings May 10, 2016) (proposal for decision); see also Flint, Securities Regulation 2016,
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Another scheme by a serial fraudster sold unregistered promissory notes
and life settlements returning 9% through a website, advertisements on
the radio, and dinner seminars in a real estate development company, an
urgent care health provider company, a health care delivery company, a
life settlement company, and an advertising company, using the funds for
personal uses, including paying off a personal tax lien.90 Another serial
fraudster sold interest in a pension income stream program that earned
returns from the payout of pension benefits the schemer acquired from
federal government employees, members of the military, and certain cor-
porations, without disclosing that federal law prohibits assignment of
pension payments.91
2. Errant Market Operators
Besides those dealers involved with unregistered securities, the TSSB
prosecuted several enforcement actions against other dealers and selling
agents. These dealers failed to supervise their agents by enforcing their
policies, leading to administrative fines.92 One dealer, in examining finan-
cial statements of agents, had a policy of requiring an explanation for all
deposits that are not dealer commissions and exceed $1,000, but failed to
follow that policy in discovering deposits of $1 million and so failed to
discover the deposits were loans from a client to the agent.93 That same
dealer also failed to supervise agents who had sold non-traded Real Es-
tate Investment Trusts (REIT) in excess of the amounts specified in the
respective REIT’s prospectus, state concentration limits, or the dealer’s
own investment guidelines.94 Tipped by a client, the TSSB reprimanded
another dealer whose agent recommended that clients invest 95% in low-
priced equities, the majority 100% invested in the energy sector, and the
majority 100% in a single company at certain times, yet failed to investi-
gate the alerts regarding the concentrated account positions, falling value
supra note 8, at 465 (discussing the 2014 emergency cease and desist order against Bal-
anced Energy).
90. See In re Tex. First Fin., LLC, No. ENF-16-CDO-1746, 2016 WL 4432579 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. Aug. 15, 2016) (emergency cease and desist order to stop selling unregistered
securities, offering securities through unregistered dealers, and engaging in fraud in con-
nection with the sales of securities; the principal failed to disclose an SEC action against his
prior selling of life settlements in Georgia).
91. See In re Sobell Corp., No. ENF-16-SDO-1741, 2016 WL 463331 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
Feb. 1, 2016) (emergency cease and desist order to stop selling unregistered securities,
engaging in fraud in connection with the sales of securities and offering securities through
materially misleading offers; the principals failed to disclose Arkansas, New Mexico, and
California cease and desist orders, and a bar from sales in Pennsylvania); see also, e.g., 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2012) (ERISA’s anti-alienation provision: “Each pension plan shall
provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”).
92. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-23-1(A)(3) (authorizing fines for viola-
tions of the act or a TSSB rule); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.10(b)(1) (West 2016)
(must reasonably enforce policies).
93. See In re Dealer Registration of LPL Fin. LLC, No. IC16-CAF-02, 2016 WL
770971 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 18, 2016) (reprimand with $95,000 fine).
94. See In re Dealer Registration of LPL Fin. LLC, No. IC15-CDO-04, 2015 WL
8000829 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 1, 2015) (ordered to remediate losses of Texas investors
from sales in excess of the limits).
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of the accounts, client complaint letters, and amended client customer
profile forms by including “speculative” as one of its investment objec-
tives.95 Another dealer failed to require contemporaneous notifications
to clients of third-party wire transfers used for customers who receive
advisory services provided by independent investment advisors, thereby
violating a rule.96 And another dealer, although it had a system to deter-
mine if any of its agents with client powers of attorney were accepting
compensation for providing investment advice, failed to follow up on de-
termining whether the agents were registered, and if not, removing
them.97
The TSSB had several enforcement actions against investment advisers
and investment adviser representatives. These involved providing invest-
ment advice for a fee without registering;98 making unsuitable recommen-
dations in penny stocks, non-traded REITs, and life settlements;99 failing
to disclose fees, costs, and bankruptcy;100 failing to keep adequate
95. See In re Dealer Registration of the Inv. Ctr., Inc., No. IC16-CAF-13, 2016 WL
4166596 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 2, 2016) (reprimanded with a fine of $50,000).
96. See In re Dealer Registration of Scottrade, Inc., No. IC16-CAF-04, 2016 WL
952027 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 7, 2016) (reprimanded with a fine of $50,000); see also, e.g.,
FIN. IND. REG. AUTH., Rule 2232, Customer Confirmations (2011), finra.complinet.com/
en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9788 [https://perma.cc/US64-
HLAW] (confirmation sent to customer at or before completion of any transaction).
97. See In re Dealer Registration of Charles Schwab & Co., No. IC-CAF-16, 2016 WL
5643543 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 22, 2016) (fined $95,000 plus agreed to contribute $30,000
for Texas investor education programs in Texas through the Investor Protection Trust).
98. See In re Catlin, No. IC16-CAF-10, 2016 WL 3131452 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 31,
2016) (solicited ten clients for $75,000; ordered to cease and desist operating as an invest-
ment adviser in violation of TSA and fined $6,000); In re Lillard, No. IC16-CAF-11, 2016
WL 3131453 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 31, 2016) (solicited seven new clients for $29,100; or-
dered to cease and desist operating as an investment adviser in violation of TSA and fined
$3,000); In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Fuller Capital Mgmt., No. IC16-CAF-08, 2016
WL 2957868 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 11, 2016) (used two unregistered solicitors compen-
sated with 35% of the annual fee assessed by the registered investment adviser; repri-
manded and fined $5,000).
99. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Rubicon Inv. Mgmt. & Analytics, LLC, No.
IC16-CAF-15, 2016 WL 5349038 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 20, 2016) (failed to maintain
records to determine investment objectives, suitability information, and required client in-
formation; failed to establish supervisory oversight of investment adviser representatives;
and failed to establish procedures to review and resolve client complaints [one dealing with
the alleged unsuitability of penny stocks in a 93-year-old client’s account]; reprimand with
undertaking and fine of $5,000); In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration and the
Agent Registration of M F Long II, No. REG16-SUS-03, 2016 WL 5888781 (Tex. St. Sec.
Bd. Oct. 4, 2016) (recommended exploratory drilling programs and non-listed REITs con-
trary to employing investment adviser’s policies to 70-year old client in amounts exceeding
client’s risk tolerance form; registration suspended for 45 days with undertaking); In re Inv.
Adviser Registration of Harrison, No. IC16-SUS-01, 2016 WL 695711 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
Feb. 16, 2016) (advised 63-year old retiree to invest her primary source of income in com-
pletely illiquid life settlements without any suitability basis; registration suspended for 90
days with undertaking and cease and desist being unregistered).
100. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Jim Poe & Assocs., No. IC16-REV-05, 2016
WL 1179748 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 18, 2016) (failed to disclose his 6% of managed invest-
ment fees were above the industry norm as required by TSA rule, and the costs of purchas-
ing life settlements; reprimanded with undertaking, registration revoked, ordered to cease
and desist violating TSA); In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Mowery Capital Mgmt., LLC,
No. IC16-CAF-06, 2016 WL 1179747 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 18, 2016) (failed to disclose to
clients receipt of a portion of trading commissions under a brokerage service contract and
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records;101 failing to update TSSB filings;102 and charging excessive fees
and withdrawing them from client funds.103
D. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
TSA section 29 provides criminal penalties for various acts.104 One ap-
pellate court considered a criminal case involving the rendering of ser-
vices as an investment advisor failing to disclose information and without
registering under the TSA.105 Ex parte Paxton involved a July 2015 three-
count indictment against the individual serving as the Texas Attorney
General for securities law violations committed in 2012 and 2011.106 Pax-
ton was charged with securities fraud in offering to sell two people (one a
state representative) over $100,000 in shares of a technology company in
July 2011 without disclosing that the company was paying him for the
sales and without divulging that he had no shares in the company (other
than the shares received as compensation).107 The SEC has charged the
a bankruptcy, and committed plagiarism by inserting name at end of another’s investment
letter on website as a letter to clients; ordered to cease and desist in the fraudulent prac-
tices, principal fined $40,000, investment adviser fined $50,000 plus $2,930 in transcription
costs); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 116.13(a) (West 2016) (Tex. St. Sec. Bd., Advisory
Fee Requirements) (to charge more than 3% of funds under management as advisory fee
requires disclosure).
101. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Valor Capital Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. IC16-
CAF-14, 2016 WL 4268922 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 8, 2016) (failed to keep records of pre-
allocations for block trades with clients and agents and did not pre-allocate consistently;
reprimanded and fined $48,000); In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Post Oak Inv. Mgmt.,
Inc., No. IC16-CAF-09, 2016 WL 3035160 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 23, 2016) (failed to send
quarterly statements or have annual independent audits when in custody of client funds as
required by TSA; reprimanded with undertaking and fined $1,000); see also 7 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 116.17 (b)(3), (c)(4) (Tex. St. Sec. Bd., Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by
Registered Investment Advisers) (quarterly statements to clients; exception for audit).
102. See In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Kuhn, No. REG16-SUS-01,
2016 WL 3035161 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 23, 2016) (failed to update Form U4 when notified
of unsatisfied judgments against him; suspended 30 days, fined $5,000).
103. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of J. Pinkernell Global Wealth, LLC., No.
IC16-SUS-17, 2016 WL 6216113 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 14, 2016) (overcharged two clients
for fees and withdrew substantially more than that from the clients’ accounts; suspended
five years, cease and desist in fraudulent business practices with undertaking); In re Inv.
Adviser Representative Registration of Hancock, No. IC16-REV-07, 2016 WL 1179746
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 23, 2016) (withdrawing fees of $1.6 million when fee was $45,000;
registration revoked, ordered to cease and desist with undertaking).
104. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-29C(3), (4)(c) (West 2015) (“Any person
who shall: . . . in connection with the rendering of services as an investment adviser or an
investment adviser representative . . . knowingly . . . omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading . . . [is] guilty of a felony of the first degree, if the amount in-
volved is $100,000 or more.”); art. 581-29I (“Any person who shall . . . [r]ender services as
an investment adviser or an investment adviser representative without being registered as
required by this Act shall be deemed guilty of a felony of the third degree.”).
105. Ex parte Paxton, 493 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. ref’d).
106. Id. at 296–97.
107. See Patrick Svitek, Paxton Surrenders in Securities Fraud Indictment, TEX. TRIB.
(Aug. 3, 2015 10:17 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/08/03/paxton-set-surrender-se-
curities-fraud-indictment [https://perma.cc/8RV8-MR5D] (including a copy of the indict-
ment with first count for lack of registration on 18 July 2012 to James and Freddie Henry,
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technology company with securities fraud.108 Paxton was also charged
with acting as an investment advisor representative to two clients for his
business partner in July 2012 without registering with the TSSB as an
investment advisor representative and for which he was paid 30% of the
commission.109 The TSSB had reprimanded and fined Paxton $1,000 after
he admitted in 2014 he had solicited investment clients for a business
partner and friend without being registered with the TSSB.110 That action
spurred leftist political groups to pressure the Travis County District At-
torney to bring a criminal action against Paxton; that district attorney,
however, referred the action to Collin County where the alleged law-
breaking occurred.111 The Collin County District Attorney, a business as-
sociate of Paxton, requested to withdraw and for the district judge to
appoint two special prosecutors.112 The two prosecutors obtained the in-
dictment. If convicted under any one of the charges, Paxton would be
ineligible to serve in a public elective office in Texas.113
In Ex parte Paxton, the Dallas Court of Appeals faced several argu-
ments under a pretrial writ of habeas corpus, primarily directed at the
failure to register as an investment advisor representative.114 The court of
appeals would uphold any cognizable argument.115 To be cognizable, the
and second and third counts for failure to disclose on 26 July 2011 to Byron Cook and Joel
Hochberg).
108. See SEC: Company Misled Investors About Energy-Efficient Technology, SEC
Press Release No. 2016-65, 2016 WL 1403523 (Apr. 11, 2016) (Servergy sold $26 million of
shares through private offerings by representing the company’s server was particularly en-
ergy-efficient without disclosure that their server’s processor was becoming obsolete in the
industry and that the large technology companies were developing high-performance serv-
ers with more powerful processors); see also SEC v. Mapp, NO. 4:16-CV-246, 2016 WL
5870576, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2016) (adding to Paxton as parties the technology com-
pany, Servergy, Inc., its founder and C.E.O., William E. Mapp III, and Caleb J. White,
another promoter). For a discussion of Mapp, see infra notes 126–40 and accompanying
text.
109. See Svitek, supra note 107; see also Brandon Formby, Paxton Will Plead Not
Guilty, Ask for Jury Trial, DALLAS NEWS (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/
politics/2015/08/03/dems-plan-to-rally-against-paxton-at-collin-county-courthouse-monday
[https://perma.cc/T3FX-QJ48] (same two offenses and dates).
110. See In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Paxton, No. IC14-CAF-03,
2014 WL 1875790, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 2, 2014) (reprimand and administrative fine
of $1,000).
111. See Patrick Svitek & Terri Langford, 2 Attorneys Appointed to Replace Collin
County DA in Paxton Probe, KERA (Apr. 22, 2015), http://keranews.org/post/2-attorneys-
appointed-replace-collin-county-da-paxton-probe [https://perma.cc/YL5V-PUKR].
112. Id.
113. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 141.001(a)(4) (West 2015) (“To be eligible to be a
candidate for, or elected or appointed to, a public elective office in this state, a person must
. . . have not been finally convicted of a felony from which the person has not been
pardoned.”); see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29C(3) (West 2015) (a felony for
an investment advisor representative to fail to disclose a material fact); art. 581-29I (a
felony for an investment advisor representative not to be registered).
114. Ex parte Paxton, 493 S.W.3d 292, 296–97 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. ref’d). One
additional issue challenged the grand jury as improperly constituted since the selection
method chose from only those jurors willing to serve. The court of appeals ruled it not
cognizable on a pretrial writ of habeas corpus since it was not a complaint that would
render the jury void. Id. at 297–301.
115. Id. at 297.
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pretrial writ of habeas corpus argument must involve “the protection of
the applicant’s substantive rights or the conservation of judicial re-
sources.”116 First, Paxton argued that he was not required under the TSA
to register.117 The TSA provides several exemptions from the filing re-
quirement, and for Paxton that was as a representative of a federally reg-
istered investment advisor, which representative is not required to
register, but only provide notice.118 Paxton’s federally registered invest-
ment advisor, Mowery Capital Management, LLC, did not terminate its
SEC registration until after the offending solicitations although its Texas
registration began before the offending solicitations; both registrations
were concurrently permitted under the then-SEC rules due to changes in
the size of the funds under management made by the Dodd-Frank Act.119
The court of appeals found the issue not cognizable under a pretrial writ
of habeas corpus since it would require construing TSA section 29I,
resolving disputed facts,120 and applying the statute to Paxton’s particular
circumstances rather than involving Paxton’s substantive rights or dealing
with conservation of judicial resources.121 Paxton’s second argument was
that the federal definition of “investment adviser representative” applies
and it either preempts the state definition in TSA section 4P or renders
TSA section 29I unconstitutionally vague because it provides competing
federal and state definitions.122 Again, the court of appeals found this not
116. See Ex parte Perry, 483 S.W.3d 884, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
117. Ex parte Paxton, 493 S.W.3d at 302–03.
118. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-12-1(B) (“The Board by rule shall author-
ize . . . a representative of a federal covered investment adviser to engage in rendering
services as an investment adviser in this state on submission to and receipt by the Commis-
sioner of: (1) a notice filing . . . and (2) a fee. . . .”).
119. See SEC Inv. Adviser Firm Summary for Mowery Capital Mgmt., LLC, https://
www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/IAPDFirmSummary.aspx?ORG_PK=130761(federal regis-
tration terminated effective 10/11/2012; Texas registration approved 6/25/2012); see also
Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed. Reg.
42950-01, 42952, 43011 (July 19, 2011), (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-2) (2017) (SEC
Rule 275.203A(c)(1) in effect in 2011, providing for mid-sized investment advisers with-
drawing from SEC registration due to the Dodd-Frank Act to withdraw before June 28,
2012, and while the investment adviser is registered with both the SEC and a state securi-
ties authority, the Investment Adviser Act and the applicable State law will be applied to
the investment adviser’s advisory activities). Mowery Capital Management, LLC was a
mid-sized investment adviser removed from federal registration by the Dodd-Frank Act’s
raising the limit from $25 million under management to $100 million.
120. Compare In re Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Paxton, IC14-CAF-03,
2014 WL 1875790, at ¶ 3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 2, 2014) (third finding of fact says Mowery
Capital Management made the transition back to state registration on June 25, 2012), with
SEC Inv. Adviser Firm Summary, supra note 119 (federal registration terminated effective
10/11/2012).
121. Ex parte Paxton, 493 S.W.3d at 303.
122. Id. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-3(a)(1) (“‘Investment adviser representative’
of an investment adviser means a supervised person of the investment adviser: (i) Who has
more than five clients who are natural persons . . . and (ii) More than ten percent of whose
clients are natural persons. . . .”), with TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4P (“‘Invest-
ment adviser representative’ . . . includes each person or company who, for compensation,
is employed, appointed, or authorized by an investment adviser to solicit clients for the
investment adviser or who, on behalf of an investment adviser, provides investment advice,
directly or through subagents, . . . to the investment adviser’s clients.”).
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cognizable since it would involve far-reaching research into federal and
state statutes and regulations to determine which definition applied.123
And third, Paxton argued that TSA section 29I was overbroad in that it
regulated commercial speech and vague in that TSA section 4P’s use of
“solicit” does not give fair notice of the proscribed conduct, and TSA
section 29I fails to provide a degree of scienter.124 The court of appeals
rejected the overbreadth concept since it is inapplicable to commercial
speech and the vagueness idea since the definition of “solicit” appears in
numerous dictionaries and since the Texas Penal Code provides the ap-
propriate scienter of knowingly rendering investment adviser services
without having registered, regardless of whether the investment adviser
representative knew he needed to be registered.125
With respect to securities fraud claims against Paxton, the SEC filed
SEC v. Mapp in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
for similar fraudulent acts under the Securities Act (SA) § 17 and the
Exchange Act (EA) §§ 10 and 15, but with such poorly thought-out
causes of action that a political motivation seems likely.126 Paxton met
with the founder of the technology company in Paxton’s office, agreed to
a 10% commission for soliciting investors, solicited at least seven inves-
tors at a meeting at the company’s offices, and solicited five other inves-
tors, generally his business associates, friends, and fellow members of an
investment club.127 Paxton solicited investors who invested $840,000, for
which he got 100,000 shares in the company, receiving an IRS Form 1099
for $100,000.128 Paxton was charged with making false statements, failing
to disclose he was being compensated for soliciting the investors, and for
failing to conduct due diligence to confirm the company’s false claims.129
123. Ex parte Paxton, 493 S.W.3d at 304. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
determined that the pretrial writ of habeas corpus is inappropriate to construe the meaning
of a statute that defines the alleged offense. See Ex parte Perry, 483 S.W.3d 884, 895 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016).
124. Ex parte Paxton, 493 S.W.3d at 304–07.
125. Id.; see Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
497 (1982) (“overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech”); Watson v. State,
369 S.W.3d 865, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (words are not vague if they are defined in
dictionaries); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.03(b) (West 2015) (“The provisions of
Titles . . . 2 [§§ 6.01 et seq.] apply to offenses defined by other laws, unless the statute
defining the offense provides otherwise. . . .”); id. § 6.02(b) (“If the definition of an offense
does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required
unless the definition plainly dispenses with any mental element.”); id. § 6.02(c) (“If the
definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, but one is nevertheless
required under Subsection (b), intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to establish crim-
inal responsibility.”); Tovar v. State, 978 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (convicted
of violating the Open Meetings Act upon a showing he knowingly called the closed meet-
ing even without proof he knew of the prohibition against closed meetings).
126. See SEC v. Mapp, No. 4:16-CV-246, 2016 WL 5870576, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 7,
2016) (adding as parties the technology company, Servergy, Inc., its founder and C.E.O.,
William E. Mapp III, and Caleb J. White, another promoter); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j,
78o (2012) (SA § 17 & EA §§ 10 & 15, respectively).
127. Mapp, 2016 WL 5870576, at *1.
128. Id. at *2.
129. Id.
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Paxton moved for dismissal of the claims against him.130 The liability
under EA § 10 was based on misstatements or omissions.131 With respect
to the false statements that the company was a “great investment,” the
district court found the claims to be mere puffery and not material.132
With respect to the other false statements (that he had met with manage-
ment and that the investment would double), the district court found that
the SEC failed to allege the statements were false or misleading.133 With
respect to the omission of the compensation, the district court found that
the SEC failed to allege a duty to speak or any statements regarding his
compensation that might be rendered a misleading half-truth.134 The lia-
bility under SA § 17 was based on his circulation of sales materials
describing the securities while failing to disclose his compensation.135 The
SEC alleged only two communications.136 With respect to the email, the
district court found no duty to disclose since the prospective investor did
not invest, hence there was no compensation received.137 With respect to
the phone call, the district court found it was not a communication since,
under the ejusdem generis interpretative doctrine, it must be tangible, and
no recording was made of the phone call.138 The liability under EA § 15
was based on Paxton’s failure to register as a broker.139 The district court
found that Paxton was not performing brokerage services of exercising
control over investor accounts, but was merely a facilitator.140 Conse-
quently, the district court conditionally dismissed the SEC’s action but
granted leave to amend the petition.141 The SEC did file an amended
petition in October 2016.142
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas delivered its
second opinion143 after the review period of this article. The SEC failed
to improve its position. With respect to the “great company” statement,
this time the SEC cited cases that found liability for factual assertions
when the spokesman knew they were false, but for Paxton, the SEC
failed to allege with the requisite particularity that Paxton knew the state-
130. Id.
131. Id. at *4.
132. Id. at *4–5.
133. Id. at *5.
134. Id. at *5–8. The district court recognized the circuit courts were split on whether a
fiduciary relationship would create that duty, but was inclined to allow it; however, the
SEC failed to allege facts to support a fiduciary relationship with the investment club. Id.
at *6.
135. Id. at *8; see 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (2012) (unlawful by means of a communication to
offer to sell a security for consideration without disclosing the receipt of such
consideration).
136. Mapp, 2016 WL 5870576, at *9–10.
137. Id. at *9.
138. Id. at *10–12.
139. Id. at *12.
140. Id. at *12–13.
141. Id. at *14.
142. See David Lee, Texas AG Paxton Faces New SEC Fraud Suit, COURTHOUSE NEWS
(Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.courthousenews.com/2016/10/24/texas-ag-paxton-faces-new-
sec-fraud-suit.htm [https://perma.cc/35WN-Q9CS].
143. SEC v. Mapp, No. 4:16-CV-246, 2017 WL 823559 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2017).
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ment was false.144 With respect to the other misstatements (that Paxton
had met with management and that the investment would double), the
SEC again failed to allege how the statements were false or misleading.145
With respect to the omission of compensation, the SEC this time claimed
a duty to speak from Paxton’s trust-like relationship with the investment
group, which had a policy of disclosing compensation.146 The SEC, how-
ever, failed to allege that Paxton controlled or dominated the investment
club members as required to establish a duty to disclose.147 The SEC then
attempted to assert the state law definition of fiduciary duty and Paxton’s
status as an attorney for one investor as providing the duty to speak.148
But the district court found state law irrelevant in order to maintain uni-
formity of federal law149 and Paxton’s services as a lawyer did not involve
the investment.150 With respect to the half-truth claim, the SEC alleged
that all the puffing statements required full disclosure of Paxton’s com-
pensation.151 The district court dismissed this assertion since the circuit
courts require the omitted half-truth to relate to the spoken half-truth—
not the case with Paxton.152 With respect to the communications charge
with the promotional email, the SEC alleged Paxton failed to conduct
due diligence before sending the promotional email, but the SEC failed
to allege any duty to do so.153 With respect to the communications charge
with the telephone call, the SEC argued for a broad interpretation of
communications to include oral communications, but the district court
used ejusdem generis to determine the communication must resemble the
others listed in the statute, which are all recorded forms.154 As to the
failure to register as a broker allegation, the SEC failed to allege that
Paxton effected transactions in securities for the account of others as re-
quired by the statutory definition of broker.155
III. SECURITIES FRAUD DECISIONS UNDER
THE FEDERAL ACTS
The fraud provisions of the TSA are modeled on the federal statutes.
Therefore, Texas courts look to federal decisions under the federal stat-
144. Id. at *6. In the Fifth Circuit, puffery does not support a securities fraud action. See
Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 372 (5th Cir. 2004).
145. Mapp, 2017 WL 823559, at *7.
146. Id. at *8.
147. Id.; see United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2006).
148. Mapp, 2017 WL 823559, at *9.
149. Id.; see Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 2014).
150. Mapp, 2017 WL 823559, at *10.
151. Id.
152. See Meyer v. Jinkosolar Holdings Co., 761 F.3d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 2014); FindWhat
Inv’r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011); In re K-Tel Int’l, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 898 (8th Cir. 2002).
153. Mapp, 2017 WL 823559, at *14; see SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 458 (1st Cir.
2010).
154. Mapp, 2017 WL 823559, at *15.
155. Id. at *16–17.
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utes to interpret the TSA provisions with similar language.156 As a result,
there is an interest in Fifth Circuit securities law fraud opinions. Fraud
actions under the federal statutes generally possess six elements: “(1) a
material misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter . . . ; (3) a connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance . . . ; (5) economic
loss; and (6) ‘loss causation,’ i.e., a causal connection between the mate-
rial misrepresentation and the loss.”157 The last element comes from the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).158 The PSLRA also
requires the investor’s petition to recite facts giving a strong inference of
scienter.159 In the Fifth Circuit, scienter requires an intent to defraud or
either severe recklessness with knowledge of the danger to investors, or
action despite danger so obvious the officer must have been aware of the
danger.160 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has rejected the group pleading
doctrine, so the scienter must be of a specific issuer officer; it may not be
implied from press releases, prospectuses, and registration statements.161
In Local 731 I.B. of T. Excavators and Pavers Pension Trust Fund v.
Diodes, Inc., the Fifth Circuit dealt with a putative class action for securi-
ties fraud under a petition alleging omissions, rather than misstatements,
evidencing the required scienter.162 The case dealt with an issuer head-
quartered in Texas but with most of its employees in China.163 The is-
suer’s February press release for fiscal year 2010 results indicated that
Chinese labor shortages would impact future first quarter results with
revenues flat or down 5% and gross profit at a certain amount.164 The
chief executive officer’s conference call with analysts attributed the labor
shortage to the Chinese policy aimed at driving economic growth inland
and to the Chinese New Year holiday, but predicted that by the second
quarter the issues would be corrected.165 The issuer’s May press release
for first quarter results revealed that the gross profit prediction was accu-
rate; however, a large number of employees had not returned so the is-
suer was hiring new workers.166 The chief executive officer’s conference
call predicted gross profit margins for the second quarter would be the
same as in the first quarter and the labor problem would be solved during
the second quarter.167
156. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
157. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (discussing commis-
sion rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004)) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
158. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012).
159. See id. § 78u-4(b)(2) (“[T]he complaint shall . . . state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”).
160. See Southland Secs. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir.
2004); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 58 SMU L. REV. 1135, 1155–56
(2005) (discussing Southland).
161. See Southland, 365 F.3d at 363–64, 366.
162. Local 731 I.B. of T. Excavators and Pavers Pension Trust Fund v. Diodes, Inc., 810
F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 2016).
163. Id. at 954–55.
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At a conference, the chief financial officer indicated that it would take
two months to train the new workers and they would not be fully efficient
for half a year. Consequently, the issuer’s stock price fell.168 The issuer’s
June press release for the second quarter results revealed management’s
gross profit margin prediction for the second quarter had been accu-
rate.169 Within two years the pension fund filed a securities fraud claim
on behalf of the class against the issuer, the chief executive officer, and
the chief financial officer.170 On the scienter issue the class urged three
facts from which to infer scienter.171 First, the class claimed that omitting
mention of harsh factory policies requiring doubling of employees’ hours
and cutting down on holiday leaves, which frustrated workers and
prompted them to quit, revealed an intent to conceal the magnitude of
the labor shortage problem.172 Second, the pension fund claimed that
shipping customer orders early implied efforts to hide the gravity of the
labor shortage.173 And third, the sale of stock by insiders implied an at-
tempt to profit.174 The district court dismissed the action for failure to
state a claim.175 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.176
With respect to the first claim of harsh factory policies, the petition did
not allege any facts that the chief executive officer and chief financial
officer in Texas knew about the harsh factory policies in China, that the
workers were disgruntled over the policies, or that they were quitting as a
result.177 The fact that, as officers, they must have known generally does
not suffice in the Fifth Circuit.178 Nor do any of the Fifth Circuit’s special
circumstance exceptions to this rule for small companies, critical transac-
tion, ready apparency, or internal inconsistency apply.179 Companies with
widely dispersed headquarters and factories with 4,000 employees aren’t
small companies; there were no allegations that the labor shortage was
critical to the company; the proximity of the labor shortage to the an-




171. Id. at 956.
172. Id. at 956–58
173. Id. at 956.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 961.
177. Id. at 958.
178. See Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension Tr. Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527,
535 (5th Cir. 2008) (scienter can’t be inferred from position in company); Abrams v. Baker
Hughes Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 432 (5th Cir. 2002) (same); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securi-
ties Regulation, 56 SMU L. REV. 1995, 2021–22 (2003) (discussing Abrams).
179. See Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 342 (5th Cir. 2008) (critical
transaction, small company, readily apparent); Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 700
(5th Cir. 2005) (critical transaction, internally inconsistent statements); Nathenson v.
Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 425 (5th Cir. 2001) (critical transaction, readily apparent, small
company, internally inconsistent statements); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Reg-
ulation, 62 SMU L. REV. 1435, 1449–50 (2009) (discussing Dorsey); George Lee Flint, Jr.,
Securities Regulation, 59 SMU L. REV. 1541, 1560–61 (2006) (discussing Plotkin).
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the company’s statements were “both consistent and accurate . . . .”180
With respect to the second claim, the early shipments did not provide a
basis on which to infer scienter.181 The early shipments were legal, they
did not conceal the labor shortage since that was disclosed, and they
would have worked to exacerbate the problem rather than conceal it
since they would create an inventory shortage making it harder to stay on
pace with orders causing a decreased gross profit margin.182 With respect
to the third claim, insider trading by itself does not establish an inference
of scienter, but can enhance such an inference if done at times or in
amounts that are suspect, meaning out of line with past practices.183 Sus-
piciousness for the case at hand cannot be determined since there are no
allegations concerning past practices.184 Moreover, the amounts sold
were small, not large, being only 12.1% of total holdings by the chief
executive officer and only 1.7% for the chief financial officer.185
The reason the class focused on omissions, rather than misstatements,
was to avoid the safe harbor for forward-looking statements provided in
the PSLRA.186 In other words, the case involved an attempt to circum-
vent the protections provided for certain statements under the securities
laws. With respect to the alleged omissions, the Fifth Circuit specifically
noted that investors would rather have the forward-looking information
rather than all the omitted reasons behind the forward-looking state-
ments.187 So although this class lost since its petition was woefully pled,
future companies in the Fifth Circuit facing unfavorable quarterly results
may take some solace in their accurate assessments of those unfavorable
results coupled with the Fifth Circuit’s refusal to water down its position
on finding knowledge from executive position and statements concerning
innocent reasons for certain actions, including stock sales.188 Other at-
tempts to circumvent the protections afforded by the PSLRA are unlikely
to succeed.
180. Local 731, 810 F.3d at 959.
181. Id. at 959–60.
182. Id.
183. See Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546,
552–53 (5th Cir. 2007); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 61 SMU L.
REV. 1107, 1124–25 (2008) (discussing Central Laborers).
184. Local 731, 810 F.3d at 961.
185. Id.
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (2012).
187. Local 731, 810 F.3d at 958 (“Most reasonable investors would rather receive an
accurate ‘bottom line’ assessment of a disclosed company problem than all of its assump-
tions and nuances.”).
188. See id. at 960 (“[E]arly shipping is a legal practice that may be supported by ‘any
number of legitimate reasons,’ and usually ‘does not support a strong inference of scien-
ter.’”) (quoting Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 203 (1st Cir. 1999); id. at 961
(“The sales represented a small portion of his investment in the company, and there are
many innocent reasons why an individual would sell stock at a given time.”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Several courts addressed the scope issues of the TSA. A Texas court of
appeals reiterated that interests in life settlements sold by an insurance
agency on behalf of the life settlement packager are securities where the
only differences from earlier forms were a pooling of the life settlements
and a supporting bond for late death of the insured. Another Texas court
of appeals found an underwriter and investment advisor liable for aiding
and abetting securities fraud committed by their affiliated investment
company for omissions and misstatements in the original prospectus of
which they were aware for an investor buying through his own broker.
The TSSB obtained an attorney general’s opinion that their staff attor-
ney’s communication to the Director of Enforcement was protected from
public disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. The TSSB also
amended several exemption rules to reflect federal changes to Regulation
A and money market funds and Texas changes to the Occupation Code
concerning auction associates; simplified its procedures by allowing email
communications with registrants, specifying balance sheet forms for regis-
trants, and expediting registration for military personnel; and created a
new rule for the registration of crowdfunding portals for public and non-
profit entities recently authorized by the legislature. The TSSB’s enforce-
ment efforts for unregistered securities focused on fraudsters marketing
oil and gas interests, high return promissory notes and life settlements,
and streams of pension income. The enforcement efforts against dealers
dealt with failure to supervise underlings by enforcing firm policies with
respect to unsuitable investments (illiquid, risky, or non-diversified pro-
grams for elders), agent registrations, and failure to require contempo-
rary notices to clients for wire transfers. The enforcement efforts against
investment advisors concerned failing to register, recommending unsuita-
ble investments, failing to disclose fees, failing to keep adequate records
and updating TSSB filings, and charging excessive fees. One Texas court
of appeals dealt with the early stages of a criminal action against an in-
vestment advisor with political rank for failure to disclose certain infor-
mation and register with the TSSB. The SEC similarly seeks civil
penalties against this same investment advisor and the involved issuer for
fraud in the failure to disclose.
For the federal fraud action, the Fifth Circuit dealt with establishing a
strong inference of scienter. The investors tried to avoid the federal safe
harbor rule for forward-looking statements by alleging omissions of mate-
rial information. The Fifth Circuit determined that the distance between
the issuer’s headquarters and the affected factory did not provide the sub-
stantial inference that the officers had scienter with respect to the alleged
omissions, especially since they did disclose a problem and their disclosed
estimates of its impact turned out to be correct. Moreover, the officers’
small percentage of issuer sales (10% or less) during the period in the
absence of a trading pattern similarly did not provide the requisite infer-
ence of scienter.
